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Is incorporation (with limited liability) 
too easily available ? 
Jacob S. ZIEGEL* 
The incorporation of new businesses in Canada is remarkably cheap 
and easy, both under the Canada Business Corporations Act and under 
the provincial corporations statutes. The benefits conferred on share-
holders by incorporation are obvious and well known, particularly the 
advantage of limited liability. Easy incorporation however also imposes 
significant burdens on the corporation's voluntary and involuntary 
creditors if the corporation cannot meet its liabilities. 
The author examines the various statutory and judicially created 
techniques for restraining the abuse of the corporate form, and finds 
them seriously deficient. Nevertheless, he sees no likelihood of the 
legislature reversing a century old trend either by making incorporation 
much more difficult or by denying directors or shareholders in closely 
held corporations the protection of limited liability. He concludes 
therefore that ' 'second order' ' remedies are much more realistic, even if 
less efficient. He also recommends several new remedies, including the 
requirement that all corporations must file a copy of their financial 
statements in a public office and that directors will be held personally 
responsible for the corporation's debts if the corporation continues to 
trade when it is clear that it is insolvent and likely to remain so. 
La constitution en corporation de sociétés commerciales est facile et 
peu coûteuse au Canada, tant sous la Loi sur les sociétés par actions que 
* Professor of Law, University of Toronto. I knew Robert Demers only slightly. 
Nevertheless, I am delighted to be able, in a very modest way, to join in this tribute to a 
gifted colleague who unhappily was taken from us very prematurely. 
Les Cahiers de Droit, vol. 31 n" 4, décembre 1990, p. 1075-1094 
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sous les lois provinciales correspondantes. Les avantages qu'en tirent les 
actionnaires sont aussi évidents que connus, surtout en ce qui a trait à la 
limite de leur responsabilité. Toutefois, la constitution en corporation, du 
fait de sa simplicité, peut porter atteinte de façon importante aux intérêts 
des créanciers volontaires et non volontaires, lorsque la société n'est plus 
en mesure de satisfaire à ses obligations. 
L'examen que fait l'auteur des divers moyens légaux et judiciaires 
destinés à réprimer l'utilisation abusive de la forme corporative fait 
ressortir l'existence de sérieuses déficiences. Par ailleurs, il semble peu 
probable que les législateurs renverseront la tendance centenaire, soit en 
rendant plus difficile la constitution en corporation des sociétés commer-
ciales, ou en retirant aux administrateurs et aux actionnaires des sociétés 
à propriété restreinte la protection de la responsabilité limitée. De l'avis 
de l'auteur, il existe des recours de « seconde classe » qui, même s'ils sont 
moins efficaces, apparaissent beaucoup plus réalistes. Parmi ces moyens 
de protection, on pourrait ainsi exiger que toute corporation dépose ses 
états financiers auprès d'une autorité publique. De plus, les adminis-
trateurs pourraient être tenus personnellement responsables des dettes de 
la société si celle-ci poursuivait ses affaires, tout en étant dans une 
situation d'insolvabilité manifeste et durable. 
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15-MINUTE CORPORATIONS IN SIX CITIES 
GET COMPANY. Aspiring tycoons with $200 and 
a free quarter hour can now get quickie incorpora-
tions from the provincial Government in seven 
Ontario cities. 
The latest while-you-wait incorporation outlet for 
time-pressed capitalists opened in Kingston yester-
day, complementing service already provided in 
Toronto, London, Thunder Bay, Sudbury, Ottawa 
and Windsor...". 
The Globe and Mail, 10 May 1983 
The two most contentious corporate law concepts in the first half of 
the 19th century were whether incorporation and limited liability for 
shareholders should be made generally available for business enterprises. 
By 1860, after much debate and incremental progress, both questions had 
been answered affirmatively in Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States1, and general incorporation statutes with limited liability 
existed in all three countries. 
Since 1860 there have been further developments, and the re-
quirements for incorporation have been much simplified and relaxed. So 
have the earlier provisions concerning the raising and maintenance of 
share capital and other provisions for the protection of creditors of the 
corporation. In Canada and the U.S.2, one-person corporations are now 
freely permitted. The results of this policy of "enablingism" are tellingly 
reflected in the above quotation from The Globe and Mail. Even more 
striking are the following statistics. In 1988 alone, 138,198 new corpora-
tions were incorporated in Canada3 and there were at least half a million 
corporations in active operation4—about the same number as for the 
1. For the Canadian history of these issues, see inter alia A.W. Currie, "The First 
Dominion Companies Act", (1962) 28 Can. J. Econ.Pol.Sc. 387, for the British history, 
L.C.B. Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th ed., London, Stevens, 
1979, ch. 3, and for the U.S. history, E.M. Dodd, American Business Corporations until 
1860, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. See also J.S. Ziegel, R.J. Daniels, 
D.L. Johnston and J.G. Macintosh, Cases and Materials on Partnerships and Canadian 
Business Corporations, Toronto, Carswell Co., 1989, 2 vols., ch. 2, esp. p. 97-103. 
2. But not yet in the United Kingdom. 
3. Canadian Federation of Independent Business (hereafter CFIB), Business Growth in 
Canada : Business Formations in Fiscal 1988/89, Table 2, p. 8. 
4. The estimate is the author's. The total number of businesses in operation in Canada 
during the fiscal year 1988/89 was 1,683,000. Id., Table 1. The ratio of new 
incorporations to newly registered proprietorships and partnerships was about .6. If this 
ratio is also representative of the general proportion of active corporations to the total 
number of active businesses, it yields a figure exceeding half a million. The number of 
active corporations in Ontario alone amounted to 511,766 in 1989. (Information supplied 
orally to author by John Flint of the Corporations' Branch of the Ontario Ministry of 
Consumer and Commercial Relations). 
1078 Les Cahiers de Droit (1990) 31 C. de D. 1075 
whole of the United Kingdom5. It seems clear then that both levels of 
government in Canada encourage incorporations and that business 
persons freely avail themselves of this permissiveness. 
Is this a good thing ? Who benefits and who suffers ? Has the 
pendulum of public policy swung too far from hostility to general 
incorporations at the beginning of the 19th century to the 'open door' 
policy at the end of the 20th century ? If public policy has erred, what can 
or should be done to reverse the trend, and how ? These are the principal 
questions addressed in this short essay. Canadian corporations law 
usually distinguishes between public or "offering" corporations (i.e., 
corporations whose shares are widely held) and private or closely held 
corporations with only a small number of shareholders or only one 
shareholder6. This essay focuses on closely held corporations. The 
emphasis is justified because commentators generally agree7 that it is 
much easier to explain a policy of limited liability for shareholders of 
public corporations than it is to justify it for shareholders of closely held 
corporations. The number of closely held corporations also vastly 
exceeds the number of public corporations8. 
1. The origins of the closely held corporation 
It is a puzzle how closely held corporations acquired such a firm grip 
on the legislatures' indulgence. It may have been more by accident than 
design. During the first half of the 19th century the advocates of general 
incorporation statutes and limited liability emphasized the need for 
private capital to finance the new roads, bridges, canals and railways that 
needed building and for the burgeoning new industries awaiting develop-
ment, and pointed out that investors would not be willing to put up the 
money if they were to be held personally responsible for the enterprise's 
debts. None of these arguments applied to owner managed businesses and 
5. For the U.K. statistics see J.H. Farrar, N. Furey and B. Hannigan, Farrar's Company 
Law, 2nd ed., London, Butterworths, 1988, p. 34-35. 
6. See F. Iacobucci and A.L. Johnston, "The Private or Closely-Held Corporation" in 
J.S. Ziegel (ed.), Studies in Canadian Company Law, Toronto, Butterworths, 1973 
vol. 2, ch. 2. 
7. See, for example, P. Halpern, M. Trebilcock and S. Turnbull, "An Economic Analysis 
of Limited Liability in Corporation Law", (1980) 30 U.T.L.J. 118, and F. Easterbrook 
and D. Fischel, "Limited Liability and the Corporation", (1985) 52 U.Chi.L.Rev. 89. 
8. At the present time, the total number of listed companies on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange amounts to 1,1204, that on the Montreal Stock Exchange approximately 669. 
(1 am indebted for this information to Mr. Ralph Shay, Director of Listings, Toronto 
Stock Exchange). 
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there is no evidence that they were pressing for the right to incorporate9. 
Although the early incorporation acts were not expressly limited to public 
corporations, their structure suggests that this is what the legislators had 
in mind. Typically the statutes required a plurality of shareholders and a 
minimum amount of paid up capital10. 
In England the question came to a head with the celebrated decision 
of the House of Lords in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.11 Mr. Salomon 
had incorporated his one-man business under the English Companies Act 
1862 and had met the requirements of the Act for a minimum of seven 
incorporators by giving one share each to the members of his family. The 
House of Lords unanimously held that this token compliance did not 
violate the statutory requirements. As Paddy Ireland has shown12, the 
result was not a foregone conclusion since business and legal opinion was 
widely (but not unanimously) opposed to the British Companies Act being 
used for the incorporation of small business firms. One may conjecture 
whether the law lords genuinely felt themselves bound by the literal terms 
of the 1862 Act (as they claimed to be) or whether they sympathized with 
the minority view that small businesses should not be denied the 
advantages of incorporation and limited liability available to their bigger 
brethren. 
Whatever Parliament's original intentions may have been, it is clear 
that by the turn of the century the minority view prevailed. This is shown 
by the fact that in 1906 the Loreburn Committee on company law 
amendments recommended the formal recognition of private companies 
and their being relieved from several onerous requirements incumbent on 
public companies, and by the fact that the recommendations were 
implemented in the Companies Act of 1907. 
These developments undoubtedly left their imprint on Canada. They 
were carried to their logical conclusion after World War II when the 
Ontario Business Corporations Act of 1970 explicitly authorized the 
9. Cf. J.M. Landers, "A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliated Questions 
in Bankruptcy", (1975) 45 U. Chi.L.Rev. 589, at p. 618 : "When corporation law was in 
its formative stage, corporations were of substantial size and were owned by a group of 
individual stockholders... The one-man or close corporation was a rarity, if it existed at 
all." 
10. For the details of such provisions in the early Canadian corporations acts, see 
A.W. Currie, supra, note 1, p. 399-400. 
11. Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] A.C. 112. 
12. P. Ireland, "The Triumph of the Company Legal Form, 1856-1914" in John Adams 
(ed.), Essays for Clive Schmitthoff, Abingdon, Professional Books Limited, 1983, p. 29, 
cited in J.S. Ziegel et al., supra, note 2, at p. 117-118. 
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incorporation of one-person corporations13. The precedent has been 
followed in the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA)14 and in most, 
if not all, of the provincial business corporations acts15. As previously 
noted, all but a few thousand of the more than half million active 
corporations in Canada are closely held and, it is safe to assume, have 
only a small number of employees or none other than the owner-
shareholder16. While in absolute terms the total number of proprietorships 
and partnerships still exceeds the number of incorporated businesses, it is 
clear that the closely held limited liability corporation is the vehicle of 
choice for more than fifty per cent of all new businesses17. 
2. The benefits and costs of incorporation 
It is easy to explain why incorporation is so attractive to business 
persons. Compared to the unincorporated form of business, the principal 
advantages are threefold : the separate legal personality of the corpora-
tion, lower levels of taxation, and limited liability for the owners. While 
all three advantages are important, the availability of limited liability is 
undoubtedly the most important and common reason why lawyers 
recommend incorporation to their clients18. From the incorporators' 
13. Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.53. See now Business Corporations Act 
1982, (hereafter OBCA), S.O. 1982, c.4, s.4(l). 
14. Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. c-44, s.5(l). 
15. Including the Quebec Companies Act. See R.S.Q., c. C-38, s. 123.9. 
16. In 1987, 76.6% of the 880,237 firms with paid employees had less than 5 employees and 
almost 98 per cent had less than 50 employees. See Canadian Federation of Independent 
Business, The Small Business Sector in Canada, Chart 1, p. 3. 
17. In fiscal year 1988-9, there were 138,198 new incorporations compared with 225,957 new 
proprietorships and partnerships. CFIB study, supra, note 3, Table 1. I have no 
statistics for the break-down of the total number of active incorporated and 
unincorporated businesses, though they may well exist. 
18. English shareholders' perception of the importance of limited liability is shown by the 
fact that, although English companies legislation has from the beginning given them an 
option to incorporate with limited or unlimited liability, companies with unlimited 
liability are very rare (297 out of 65,727 companies incorporated in 1979). This is so even 
though unlimited companies enjoy some important advantages. See Companies Act 
1985, ss. l(2)(c), 241(4), and J.H. Farrar et al., supra, note 5, p. 30-31. The importance 
attached by British incorporators to limited liability is also shown by the fact that, in 
advising the Department of Industry and Trade on the feasibility of a new form of 
incorporation for small firms, Prof. Go wer recognized that it would have little chance of 
acceptance if it did not also confer limited liability. See A New Form of Incorporation 
for Small Firms [A consultative Document], Annexe A, para. 10 (Cmnd. 8171, 1981). 
Prof. Gower reached this conclusion even though the availability of limited liability may 
be illusory for many small companies because banks usually require a personal 
guarantee from the shareholders or directors. It is safe to assume that, faced with the 
same options, Canadian incorporators would react the same way. 
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perspective, the costs of incorporating a closely held corporation are also 
remarkably modest. In most of the provincial acts the formalities of 
incorporation have been reduced to a minimum, as have the annual 
reporting requirements where they still exist19. The governments' 
incorporation fee is quite manageable20. There are no requirements for a 
minimum amount of paid up capital ; in fact, the corporation need never 
issue more than a single share where there is only one shareholder. The 
current acts contain generous provisions enabling the corporation to 
purchase its own shares, and to enable others to do so, as long as it does 
not impair the solvency of the corporation21. With one irrelevant 
exception22, none of the corporation's financial statements are required to 
be filed in a public office or otherwise to be made available for general 
inspection by the public. Finally, the obligation to hold shareholders' and 
directors' meetings have been greatly simplified. No meeting needs to be 
held at all if all the shareholders or directors respectively agree on a 
resolution in writing23. 
From the perspective of the corporation's creditors, the easy 
availability of incorporation looks much less attractive and imposes 
substantial costs. The important costs appear to be the following: 
• Easy incorporation fosters a casual attitude to responsible business 
ethics. 
The British experience appears to undermine the claim of R.E. Meiners, J.S. Mofsky 
and R.D. Tollinson ((1979) 4 Del. J. Corp. Law 351, at p. 364, also cited in J.H. Farrar, 
supra, note 5, p. 68) that the primary reasons for the corporate form of business are not 
related to the availability of limited liability but are based on (1) the marketability of 
shares ; (2) perpetual existence ; (3) flexible financing methods ; (4) specialization of 
management ; and (5) majority rule. The first advantage only applies to public 
corporations and, in Canada, with proper drafting and the use of trustees, advan-
tages (3), (4) and (5) can be substantially secured by unincorporated partnerships. 
19. For example, under the Ontario Corporations Information Act, R.S.O. 1980, C.95, 
s.3(3), a filing is only necessary where there has been a change in the particulars since 
the previous filing. 
20. In 1987, Prince Edward Island had the lowest fee with $150, the federal government the 
highest with $500. Ontario charged $220 and Quebec had a sliding scale, starting with 
$300, which varied with the amount of the authorized capital. Lawyers' fees for 
incorporating a simple corporation seem to range from $300 to $500. Computer 
programmes enable the documentation to be prepared with minimal effort. 
21. See e.g. : CBCA ss. 32, 42 and OBCA, ss. 20, 30. 
22. CBCA, s. 154(1) (b) requires a CHC whose gross revenues in the accounting year exceed 
$10 million, or whose assets exceed $5 million, to file with the Director the annual 
financial statements prescribed by s.149. Obviously this requirement will not apply to 
the overwhelming majority of closely held corporations whose gross revenues and 
assets fall much below these threshold figures. 
23. CBCA, ss.112, 136 and OBCA ss.104, 129. 
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• It encourages serious undercapitalization of the business and exces-
sive reliance on outside credit. Equally disconcerting is the fact, as 
Salomon v. Salomon24 shows, that the doctrine of corporate person-
ality enables a shareholder to become a secured creditor of his own 
corporation, thus further undermining the prospects of payment to the 
corporation's unsecured creditors if the corporation runs into difficul-
ties. 
• It imposes heavy risks of non-payment on voluntary creditors and 
even greater risks on the corporation's involuntary creditors (tort 
claimants and municipal, provincial and federal tax claims and such 
like). The risks are greatly magnified when a business promoter 
incorporates a flock of affiliated corporations each of which is 
undercapitalized25, or when a solvent parent corporation runs an 
empire of subsidiaries as if they were part of a single business while 
insisting on their separate legal personalities if things go awry26. 
• It leads to a rapid increase in the number of corporate bankruptcies, 
especially in periods of recession. 
• It encourages professionals, and other persons not presently eligible 
for it, to seek the right to incorporate27. 
These claims need not be taken at face value and it is necessary to 
examine them more closely to see how far they are supported by practical 
experience. So far as the dangers of undercapitalization and other forms 
of opportunistic conduct are concerned, the point is frequently made that 
banks, landlords and other large creditors can, and usually do, protect 
themselves, by requiring the owners of the corporation to give personal 
24. Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd., supra, note II. 
25. Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Zhelka, (1967) 64 D.L.R. (2d) 457 (Ont.). The issue here however 
was not the undercapitalization of the affiliated corporations but the shunting of assets 
among them so as to confuse the bankrupt's creditors. A clearer example of 
undercapitalization is the celebrated New York Court of Appeals' decision in 
Walkovsky v. Carlton, (1966) 223 NE. (2d) 6. Another well known example is Minton 
v. Cavaney, (1961) 364 P. (2d) 473 (Cal.). 
26. This problem constitutes the focus of Prof. Landers' examination, supra, note 9. A good 
Canadian analogue is De Salaberry Realties Ltd. v. MNR, (1974) 46 D.L.R. (3d) 100 
(Fed. T.D.). 
27. For example. Alberta and British Columbia currently permit the incorporation of 
chartered accountants, dentists and lawyers, three groups of professionals to whom 
incorporation was not previously available. For the details, see J.S. Ziegel et al., supra, 
note 1, p.242-243. In Ontario, the Legal Profession Statute Law Amendment Act, 1990, 
S.O. 1990, c.8 (assented to June 28, 1990, but so far only partly proclaimed in force) now 
also permits the practice of law in coiporate form. 
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guarantees . In the alternative or in addition, these creditors may 
demand security from the corporation or its principal shareholders, or 
both29. In short, bankers and other large voluntary creditors can 
effectively contract around the limited liability hurdle. It may also be 
argued that opportunistic conduct by owners is not as common as is often 
assumed. Even if they do not invest a large amount of their personal 
wealth in the corporation, owner-managers do contribute a large amount 
of human capital which gives them a strong incentive to make a success 
out of the corporation. 
So far as trade creditors are concerned, it is generally assumed that 
they can implicity insure themselves against the corporation's default by 
adding a credit risk "premium" to the cash price of their goods or 
services. However, this is easier said than done. Most small trade 
creditors do not have credit departments and many are quite unsophis-
ticated in their credit practices30. It is also claimed that the short term 
nature of trade credit enables trade creditors to adjust their credit 
practices quickly in the light of changing circumstances, and that their 
knowledge of the trade gives them a superior ability to evaluate the credit 
risks they are facing. Again, these are questionable assumptions : a debtor 
corporation can acquire a large amount of supplies on a 30 or 60 days 
credit basis, especially in cyclical industries, before the supplier becomes 
aware of the debtor's financial difficulties. Even if the foregoing 
assumptions are correct, they do not protect the supplier against other 
28. In 1988, in conjunction with Billy Garton, a former student, the writer analyzed 
140 randomly selected "business" bankruptcy files in Metro Toronto. 95 were pure 
bankruptcy files (i.e., files that allegedly involved no personal debts) and 35 were 
"guarantor" files in which a majority of the debts arose out of one or more business 
guarantees given by the individual bankrupt. If anything, the guarantor figures 
underestimate the frequency of guarantees of corporate debts. One very experienced 
Toronto trustee in bankruptcy recently told the writer that, in his experience, most small 
corporate bankruptcies also involve a personal guarantee. 
29. The recently enacted personal property security legislation in the western provinces and 
in Ontario make it very easy to take a security interest in all of a debtor's present and 
future movable assets. See for example the Ontario Personal Property Security Act 
1989, S.O. 1989, c.16, ss.9-13, and cf. J.S. Ziegel, "Too much, Too Little or Just 
Right ?", (1990) 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175. Banks also have the benefit of the special security 
regime under Section 178 of the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-1, although it is not as 
extensive or as simple as the new provincial regimes. 
30. In the Garton/Ziegel bankruptcy study described in the text, unsecured suppliers of 
goods and services represented 59.6% of the total number of unsecured claims and 
62.8% of the total number in value. The rate of recovery by the goods suppliers was 
10% compared with a rate of 3% for the services suppliers. The average rate of 
recovery for all unsecured claims was 5.0%. 
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forms of opportunistic behaviour in the absence of personal liability by 
the debtor corporation's owners. 
Among the corporation's other voluntary creditors, its employees, 
especially if they are unorganized, are generally regarded as very 
vulnerable in the absence of protective legislation. An equally important 
group exhibiting similar characteristics are consumers — those who 
prepay for goods that are never delivered or for services that are not 
provided because of the corporation's collapse31. Or again, even if the 
goods are delivered or the services are rendered, the consumer may lose 
the benefit of accompanying warranties if the retailer or manufacturer is 
no longer in a position to honour them. 
Among a corporation's involuntary creditors, tort victims are 
regularly seen as uncompensated risk bearers if the corporation is 
undercapitalized or fails to carry sufficient insurance32. However, tort 
claims are infrequent in corporate bankruptcies or reorganizations 
although mega-tort claims will almost certainly lead to the corporation's 
collapse even if the corporation is insured33. How often, however, will a 
one-person corporation be involved in a mega-tort claim ? Curiously, the 
literature on limited liability generally overlooks a quantitatively much 
more important group of involuntary creditors—federal and provincial 
government claims for unpaid taxes and similar assessments against the 
corporation, or for failure to remit taxes deducted at source. Such claims 
regularly appear in corporate bankruptcies34. However, it must be 
admitted that Crown claimants are much closer to voluntary creditors in 
their capacity to anticipate and protect themselves against such defaults, 
whether by spreading the risk across all tax payers or by giving the Crown 
a first lien on the debtor's property which takes priority over all other 
31. For a good example of the former type of problem, see Royal Bank of Canada 
v. 216200 Alberta Ltd., (1987) 51 Sask. Rep. 146 (Sask. C.À.) and Law Reform 
Commission of British Columbia, Report on the Buyer's Lien : A New Consumer 
Remedy, L.R.C. 93, 1987. 
32. See Walkovsky v. Carlton, supra, note 25. 
33. The Johns-Manville Corporation is a high profile example of a U.S. corporation filing for 
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code because of mega-tort 
asbestos claims. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., (1984) 36 Bankr. 727. 
34. In the Ziegel/Garton study such claims represented just under 5% in dollar value of all 
claims filed in the 95 pure business bankruptcies. 
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claims . Crown claims also enjoy preferred status over unsecured 
creditors pursuant to s. 136(1) of the Bankruptcy Act36. 
The overall result then is that closely held corporations that are 
insolvent are likely to have a broad range of creditors with different 
characteristics, some of whom almost certainly will not be able to protect 
themselves adequately against the corporation's default. Does this mean, 
as has been suggested37, that limited liability is an inefficient regime for 
the closely held corporation and that the corporation's owner should be 
held personally responsible for some of all of the corporation's unmet 
liabilities ? Before attempting to answer this question we must examine 
first the law's current response to these problems. 
3. Statutory and judicial responses 
3.1. Statutory responses 
British and North American legislatures appreciated from the 
beginning the potential for abuse of the privilege of limited liability and 
sought to offset it in a variety of ways. It is not necessary to give an 
exhaustive list of the techniques used but the following summary will 
convey the flavour of the most important approaches. 
3.1.1. Disclosure of limited liability status 
To alert creditors to the fact that they are dealing with a limited 
liability corporation, the Canadian Acts invariably require the inclusion in 
the company's name of one of the words "Corporation", "Limited" or 
"Incorporated" or the abbreviations " Inc ." or "Ltd."3 8 . Legislation also 
frequently requires a corporation to set out its names in legible characters 
"in all contracts, invoices, negotiable instruments and orders for goods 
and services"39. The difficulty about these sensible requirements is that 
the sanctions for non-compliance are largely ineffectual and usually only 
35. Crown lien claims have sparked a large body of case law, legislative proposals, and 
professional comment. See inter alia : W.A. Bogart, "Statutory claims and personnal 
property security legislation: a proposal" (1983-84) 8 C.B.L.J. 129; Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Ottawa, Jan. 1986), p. 38s. ; and 
Kavcar Investments Ltd. v. Aetna Financial Services Ltd., (1989) 62 D.L.R. (4th) 
277 (O.C.A). 
36. Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3. 
37. P. Halpern, M. Trebilcock and S. Turnbull, supra, note 7, at p. 147-150. 
38. See e.g. : CBCA, s.lO(l) and OBCA, s.lO(l). 
39. CBCA 10(5), OBCA 10(5), and Corporations Information Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.96, s. 3. 
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involve an unenforced summary jurisdiction fine or an equally hypotheti-
cal order for compliance40. 
3.1.2. Rules concerning the raising and maintenance of share capital 
and restrictions on financial assistance 
As previously mentioned, the early 19th century corporations Acts 
frequently contained requirements for a minimum amount of paid up 
capital and, in England, such a requirement still applies to public 
corporations41. In the other EEC countries a minimum amount of paid up 
capital is the norm for private limited companies42. In Canada, on the 
other hand, the attempt to impose capitalization requirements was 
abandoned earlier in this century43, presumably because it was felt that 
such a requirement was arbitrary and largely futile. The modern 
corporations Acts have gone still further and have repealed or heavily 
diluted the earlier rules44 (many of them of judicial origin) preventing a 
corporation from purchasing its own shares or to provide assistance for 
the purchase by others of such shares, or prohibiting the payment of 
40. In the case of the OBCA the sanctions are a fine (s.257) and an order for compliance 
(s.252). Some courts have also denied the directors of the corporation the protection of 
limited liabilitj when the corporation's name was not properly disclosed but the 
reasoning leading to this conclusion are of doubtful validity. See e.g. : Wolfe v. Moir, 
(1969) 69 W.W.R. 70 (Alta.) and Taw Enterprises Lid. v. Rode & Scott Bradley 
Marketing Ltd., (1979) 17 A.R. 432. 
41. Companies Act 1985, s.118 (the minimum amount is /50,000 or approx. $120,000). 
42. See the table on capital requirements in A New Form of Incorporation for Small Firms, 
supra, note 18, p. 41. 
43. Until 1883, the federal Companies Act (as it was then known) required companies to 
have a minimum paid up share capital of $500 "with which a company shall carry on 
business". See e.g. : Companies Act, R.S.C. 1927, c.27, s.9.8. The provision was 
omitted in the Companies Act, 1934, 24-25 Geo. V, c.33, and has not reappeared since. 
Until 1930, the federal legislation also prohibited companies from commencing 
operations or incurring liabilities until a prescribed percentage of the company's 
authorized capital had been subscribed for. See e.g. : Companies Act, R.S.C. 1927, c.27, 
s.28. This provision was deleted by a 1930 amendment. See Companies Act Amending 
Act, S.C. 1930, c.9, s . l l . 
So far as I have been able to ascertain from the resources at my disposal, the post-
1860 Ontario legislation never required a minimum amount of paid up capital. However, 
the Act of 1864 contained restrictions similar to that in the later Dominion Acts 
precluding a company from commencing operations until one-half of the proposed 
capital had been subscribed for in good faith and 10% of the subscribed stock had been 
paid in. A. W. Currie, supra, note 1, at p. 400. These requirements were soon abandoned 
since they do not appear in the 1877 Revised Statutes. See The Ontario Joint Stock 
Companies Letters Patent Act, R.S.O. 1877, c. 150. 
44. See F.W. Wegenast, The Law of Canadian Companies, Toronto, Carswell, 1979, 
ch. XXI, esp. p. 464-467, and p. 477-482. 
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dividends out of capital. Instead, the contemporary legislation largely 
confines itself to an insolvency test — will the contemplated activity make 
the corporation insolvent45 ? 
Although there are no general capital raising and maintenance 
requirements, exceptionally directors are held personally liable for the 
corporation's debts in two circumstances : (a) for unpaid wages46, and (b) 
to the federal government for unpaid taxes where the failure to pay is 
attributable to the directors' neglect to exercise reasonable care, diligence 
and skill in the performance of their statutorily mandated duties47. 
Canadian insolvency legislation has no provision comparable to s.214 
of the British Insolvency Act 1986 holding a director liable for wrongful 
trading where he knew or ought to have concluded that there was no 
reasonable prospect of the company avoiding its insolvent liquidation48. 
Could the same result be reached under the Canadian business corpora-
tions acts by holding the director liable in damages for failure to conduct 
the corporation's affairs in a reasonably prudent manner49? Alter-
natively, could creditors complain that they have suffered damages 
because of "unfairly prejudicial" conduct by the directors in permitting 
the corporation to operate without adequate capitalization50? The 
difficulty in both cases is that the director may not have breached a duty 
owing to the creditor ; without such a breach, it may be argued, there can 
be no liability in damages51. However, the possibility of using these 
45. See e.g. : OBCA ss.20, 30, 32, 38. 
46. CBCA s.119, OBCA s.131, and see for one of many such cases Mesheau v. Campbell, 
(1983) 141 D.L.R. (3d) 155 (O.C.A.). The statutory provisions are of American origin. 
See further, D.B. Gleig, "Unpaid Wages in Bankruptcy", (1987) 21 U.B.C. L. Rev. 66. 
47. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c.140, s.124(1), adding s.227.1(3) to the Income 
Tax Act. See further R.L. Campbell, "Directors' Diligence Under the Income Tax 
Act", (1990) 16 C.B.L.J.4S, and E.P. Moskovitz, "Directors' Liability under Income 
Tax Legislation and Related Statutes", (1990) 38 Can. Tax J. 537. 
48. See further R.M. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1990, p. 203-213. The British offence of wrongful trading must not be confused 
with provisions such as s.173(c) of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3, 
entitling a court to refuse the discharge of a bankrupt on the ground that the bankrupt 
continued to trade after knowing himself to be insolvent. 
49. CBCA s.122(1), OBCA s.134(1). 
50. CBCA s.241, OBCA s.247. 
51. Western Finance Co. Ltd. v. Tasken Enterprises Ltd., (1980) 106 D.L.R. (3d) 81 (Man. 
CA.). 
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provisions as a proxy for obliging the directors to ensure that the 
corporation is adequately funded should not be excluded entirely52. 
3.1.3. Publicity 
The Canadian Acts require the filing of information in a public office 
giving the location of the corporation's head office or registered office and 
giving the names of its current directors53. 
Prescribed records must also be maintained at the corporation's head 
office and made accessible there to shareholders and creditors54. 
However, none of these provisions enable creditors to determine the 
solvency of the corporation since the information of record does not 
include any of the corporation's financial reports. The creditor must 
obtain this information by other means. This is in striking contrast with 
the position under the British Companies Act where, since 1967, private 
companies, no less than public companies, have been obliged to file 
prescribed financial statements with the Registrar of Companies55. 
3.1.4. Conclusion 
The upshot of this cursory examination of the statutory provisions is 
that, with modest exceptions and subject to one or two larger but untested 
possibilities, the Canadian corporations acts do remarkably little to 
protect creditors against the abuses of limited liability. Apparently the 
creditors are expected to fend for themselves. Their position compares 
very unfavourably with that of minority shareholders who, it is generally 
52. CBCA s. 122(2) and OBCA s.247(2) do not require the complainant to prove the breach 
of a duty owing to it, only that (inter alia) the powers of the directors have been 
exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of any "security holder, creditor, director or officer" of the 
corporation. "Complainant" is broadly defined in CBCA s.238, OBCA s.244(b). It may 
therefore be open to an aggrieved creditor to argue that it is prejudicially affected if the 
directors permit the corporation to operate knowing it is seriously undercapitalized. 
Whether the court will accept this argument is another matter. These issues were not 
raised in Western Finance v. Tasker Enterprises, supra, note 51. 
53. CBCA s. 19 and Regs. Forms 3 and 6, and Corporations Information Act, supra, 
note 39, s.3. 
54. CBCA s.2l, OBCA s.140, s.145. 
55. Companies Act 1985, Pi. VII, ch. II, now replaced by Companies Act 1989. ch. II, and 
see further J.H. Farrar et al., supra, note 5, p. 478, p. 481-82. The scope of the required 
disclosures under these provisions is much smaller than for public companies. For the 
EEC's disclosure requirements for small companies, see EEC 4th Company Law 
Directive 78/660 and J.H. Farrar et al., supra, note 5, p. 458-60. 
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agreed, have been treated very solicitously under the recent legislation56. 
Given the statutory lacuna, the challenge facing the courts is to respond 
where the legislatures have remained silent. How far have the judges been 
willing to accept the call ? 
3.2. Judicial responses—Lifting the corporate veil 
A preliminary difficulty that faces a creditor seeking to persuade a 
court to ignore the corporate veil in order to hold the owner-directors of 
the closely held corporation personally liable is to present a credible 
theory for his argument. What entitles the court to ignore the separate 
personality of the corporation and the well established proposition that 
debts and obligations incurred on behalf of the corporation are the 
corporation's debts and obligations and not those of the individual 
actors ? How does the tribunal overcome the stern statutory admonition 
that "the shareholders of a corporation are not, as shareholders, liable for 
any liability, act or default of the corporation" except where so 
provided"57? 
The difficulties are not as formidable as they may appear at first 
sight. The business corporations acts are not an exhaustive code of all the 
rules and principles applicable in this branch of commercial law ; 
unquestionably, they presuppose that the general principles of contract, 
tort, agency, tort and other branches of private law will continue to apply. 
The same will be true of the transcendent principles of "loyalty, good 
faith, and avoidance of a conflict of duty and interest" that govern the 
conduct of the corporation's officers and directors58 and their duty to act 
"honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation". 
Indeed, these duties are expressly enjoined on them in the legislation59. 
It appears then that Canadian courts are not nearly as handicapped in 
preventing abuses of the corporate form as is often supposed. True, they 
have not been as willing (or imaginative ?) in using their powers as have 
their more activist American brethren, but this is attributable to a more 
cautious judicial temperament and not to a lack of suitable weapons in the 
legal armoury. Rather, a survey of the case law indicates that the 
appropriate doctrines are in place for an effective policing role by the 
courts even if they have not yet been used widely for this purpose. 
56. For the details, see F. lacobucci, M.L. Pilkington, and J.S. Prichard, Canadian 
Business Corporations, Toronto, Canada Law Books, 1977, ch. 6(D). 
57. CBCA s.45, OBCA, s.109. 
58. Cf. Laskin J. in Canadian Aero Services Ltd. v. O'Malley [1974] S.C.R. 592, at p. 620. 
59. CBCA s.l22(l)(a), OBCA s.l34(l)(a). 
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To illustrate, principles of "estoppel" have been invoked to impose 
personal liability on a director who misrepresents the status of his 
enterprise60. The "fraud" doctrine has been applied to prevent cir-
cumvention of restrictive convenants and other contractual obligations by 
the interposition of the corporate veil61 and, it would seem, is available to 
enable creditors of a bankrupt debtor to reach assets concealed from them 
by the same device62. The rule that every person is accountable for his 
tortious conduct is increasingly being invoked to hold directors liable for 
improperly procuring breach of a contract by the corporation63 or 
authorizing the infringement of patent rights64. "Agency or instrumen-
tality" concepts are a familiar and favourite judicial device for denying 
tax advantages to a corporate subsidiary or affiliate that has no authentic 
existence but is only a puppet in the hands of the parent corporation65. In 
one case66, the Supreme court of Canada even applied a "business 
60. See inter alia Wolfe v. Moir, supra, note 40, West Fraser Builder Supplies v. Vander 
Horst, [1990] B.C.J. No. 146 (B.C.CA.), and Royal Stores Limited v. Brown, (1956) 
5 D.L.R. (2d) 146 (B.C.). Estoppel principles appear to have been overlooked in 
B.G. Preeco (Pacific Coast) Ltd. v. Bon Street Holdings Ltd., (1989) 60 D.L.R. (4th) 
30, 43 B.L.R. 67 (B.C.C.A.), on which see Comment by J.H. Farrar in (1990) 16 
C.B.L.J. 474. 
61. Gilford Motor Co. v. Holmes, [1933] Ch. 935 ; Jones v. Lipman, [1962] 1 W.L.R. 832 ; 
and Big Bend Hotel Ltd. v. Security Mutual Casualty Co., (1979) 19 B.C.L.R. 102 (S.C.) 
(material non-disclosure of insurance risk). See also Manley Inc. v. Fallis, (1977) 
2 B.L.R. 277 (O.C.A.) where the court treated the parent company and its subsidiary as 
one person for the purpose of establishing fiduciary breach by an employee. 
62. Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Zhelka, (1967) 64 D.L.R. (2d) 457 (Ont.). The case is sometimes 
cited to illustrate Canadian courts' reluctance to lift the corporate veil even where 
fraudulent conduct is alleged. A careful reading of Thompson J's judgment shows 
however that his conclusion was based on other grounds, in particular the trustee's 
failure to show how he had been prejudiced by the bankrupt's conduct and the fact that 
there were no complaints from creditors of the companies whose assets had been 
manipulated by the bankrupt. 
63. See for example McFadden v. 481782 Ontario Ltd., (1984) 47 O.R. (2d) 134 (Ont.), and 
cf. W.A. Richardson, "Making an End Run Around the Corporate Veil: the Tort of 
Inducing Breach of Contract", (1984) 5 Adv. Q. 103. 
64. Mentmore Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandising Mfg. Co. Inc., (1978) 89 D.L.R. 
(3d) 195 (F.C.A.) and cf. C. Evans & Sons Ltd. v. Spritebrand Ltd., [1985] 2 All E.R. 
415 (CA.). 
65. See De Salaberry Realties Ltd. v. M.N.R., supra, note 26, affd (1976) 70 D.L.R. (3d) 
707 (F.C.A.), and the many earlier authorities cited in Decary J's judgment. 
66. Covert v. Nova Scotia, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 774. 
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purpose" test to determine the true beneficiaries for the purpose of a 
provincial Succession Duties Act67. 
All these techniques are promising. However, it must be acknow-
ledged that so far they have only been used sparingly to impose personal 
liability on the owners of closely held corporations. Some Canadian 
courts have flatly refused to lift the corporate veil where the principal 
complaint was that the corporation was chronically undercapitalized68. 
4. The public choice question 
Where do we go from here ? In an earlier paper69, Halpern, 
Trebilcock and Turnbull argued that unlimited liability is the most 
efficient regime for the owners of closely held corporations. As an 
abstract proposition it has much to commend it. With one clean stroke it 
will dispose of the abuses and externalities generated by the limited 
liability rule and restore incorporation to its more legitimate functions. 
Gone will be the need for statutory provisions for the protection of 
creditors (or as many of the requirements as remain) and for all the 
elaborate techniques and rationalizations for lifting the corporate veil. 
However, the authors' conclusion is not without its difficulties. To 
begin with, as they themselves recognize, unlimited liability is only 
important for involuntary creditors such as tort claimants70 and for a 
limited group of voluntary creditors, such as employees, who cannot 
readily contract around the limited liability rule. So far as tort claimants 
are concerned, it has been previously suggested that statistically they do 
not present an important class. In the motor vehicle area, the area that in 
the past has attracted most attention, legislators have shown themselves 
67. The business purpose test is of American origin and was first applied in a tax case by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering, (1934) 293 U.S. 465. It was belatedly 
embraced by the House of Lords in W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. I.R.C., [1981] 2 W.L.R. 449 
but rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Stubart Investments Ltd. v. R., (1984) 
10 D.L.R. (4th) 1. See further J.W. Durnford, "The Corporate Veil in Tax Law", (1979) 
27 Can. T.J. 282. 
68. The best known example of this genre is the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in 
Rockwell Developments Ltd. v. Newtonbrook Plaza Ltd., (1972) 27 D.L.R. (3d) 651. 
The court's judgment was written by a well known conservative judge and apparently 
the court was not asked to lift the corporate veil to attach personal liability to the 
individual officer. In any event, the decision has not sat well with either legislators or 
other courts. See now Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 (security for costs) and 
the decision in 269335 Alberta Ltd. v. Starlite Investments Ltd., (1987) 18 C.P.C. (2d) 
161 (Alta. Q.B.). 
69. R. Halpern et al., supra, note 7, at p. 148-150. 
70. The authors do not discuss the effects of a limited liability regime on other involuntary 
creditors such as governmental agencies and Crown corporations. See supra, p. 1084. 
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responsive in introducing insurance requirements of growing severity and 
with expanded third party coverage that ensure compensation for tort 
victims much more effectively than unlimited liability for incorporators 
ever could. Environmental issues are now receiving the same close 
scrutiny. 
Another difficulty is that the authors mistakenly assume that rules 
that force the corporation's owners to assume personal liability for their 
acts will eliminate uncompensated for risks. This is only partially true. It 
will not prevent unqualified or underfunded individuals from embarking 
on risky activities. As Easterbrook and Fischel have rightly observed71, 
all persons, incorporated or not, enjoy limited liability because every-
one's resources are finite. This is the reason why bonding, insurance and 
licensing requirements will continue to be necessary in sensitive areas of 
the economy whether or not owners of closely held corporations are held 
personally responsible for the corporation's debts72. 
Still another difficulty is that the authors would apparently deny 
limited liability to all the shareholders in a closely held corporation 
regardless of their involvement in the management of the corporation. 
This goes too far and would put inactive shareholders in a worse position 
than limited partners in a limited partnership73. 
Leaving aside these specific difficulties, there is a broader public 
choice question that must be addressed. Who is agitating for removal of 
the limited liability regime for closely held corporations ? Who would 
support it if the proposal were made ? The likely constituencies are not 
obvious. Potential tort victims not protected by existing legislation would 
be difficult to organize. Powerful voluntary creditors capable of pro-
tecting themselves (large lenders and landlords and such like) would 
probably be indifferent. Other more vulnerable voluntary creditors 
(mainly small trade creditors) are themselves beneficiaries of the limited 
liability regime and presumably would not wish to shoot themselves in the 
71. R.Halpern et al., supra, note 7, at p. 90. 
72. Financial intermediaries accepting deposits from the public are a paradigmatic example 
of legislators imposing strict licensing and depositary insurance requirements for the 
benefit of depositors. In the consumer area, many of the provinces impose licensing 
(and in some cases bonding) requirements on such diverse occupations as door to door 
selling, debt collection agencies, and motor vehicle dealers. In addition, industry 
sponsored insurance funds exist to protect consumers against the insolvency of 
stockbrokers and investment dealers, life and health and casualty insurance companies, 
travel agencies, and builders of new homes. 
73. Under modern limited partnerships Acts a limited partner is only liable as a general 
partner if he takes part in the control of the business. See for example the Limited 
Partnership Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.241, s.12. 
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foot. If forced to choose, consumers and similar unincorporated cons-
tituencies would probably opt for more focused remedies that address 
their concerns such as licensing, bonding or insurance requirements74. 
Finally, owners of closely held corporations would complain loudly that 
"the little guys", "the backbone of the modern economy", were being 
discriminated against in favour of the shareholders of public corporations. 
These practical considerations lead one to conclude that a modified 
version of the status quo — a combination of statutory requirements or 
liabilities coupled with more active judicial lifting of the corporate veil to 
prevent the most obvious abuses — is likely to be the most attractive 
prescription despite its obvious imperfections and uncertainties. This is 
not to suggest that society can afford to be complacent or to suggest that 
governments should do nothing. What it does indicate is that governments 
will likely only be receptive to second order remedies and probably only 
those that are not too visible or likely to arouse violent opposition. 
If we must settle for such compromise solutions, what changes 
should be recommended ? Strengthening the sanctions for non-com-
pliance with the corporate name disclosure requirements is an obvious 
and relatively uncontroversial step. However, the requirements them-
selves need some refining. A more important reform is to require all 
closely held corporations, and not merely public corporations, to file 
annually a simplified copy of their financial reports with a view to lending 
a minimum amount of transparency to their activities and state of 
solvency. 
Resurrecting the old requirements for a minimum amount of paid up 
capital would undoubtedly engender much opposition unless the amount 
was nominal. Moreover, the requirement has little to commend it. Unless 
a complex scheme of classification were adopted75, any statutory figure 
would be quite arbitrary and would not ensure the solvency of the 
corporation. It would also tie up scarce resources since many corpora-
tions are quite inactive or are only set up for a limited purpose76. 
A better option would be to strenghten the provisions in the federal 
Bankruptcy Act. This would also have the advantage of imposing a 
74. It is unlikely, for example, that the owner-managers of a wholesale travel agency would 
be able from their own resources to compensate the prospective travellers in a planeful 
of passengers if the flight was cancelled or the travellers found themselves stranded at 
the destination. Several of the provinces have addressed the problem by introducing an 
industry wide insurance plan. 
75. As is true, for example, in the case of depository financial institutions whose solvency is 
of major public concern. 
76. For example, to act as a vehicle for a takeover offer. 
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uniform set of rules across Canada and avoid a competition in laxity 
among provincial corporations regimes77. Subordinating loans made by an 
owner to her own corporation or by a parent corporation to a subsidiary 
would be a possibility though almost certainly unpopular78. A less 
controversial provision would be to allow the court to subordinate a non-
arm's loan between the corporation and its controlling shareholder if the 
terms were found to be unfair. A much more important proposal would be 
to introduce a wrongful trading liability provision comparable to section 
214 of the British Insolvency Act. This would act as a powerful proxy for 
an adequate capitalization requirement and would make it much more 
difficult for irresponsible company promoters to walk away unscathed 
from a collapsed enterprise. Undoubtedly the proposal also has sig-
nificant disadvantages since it could involve difficult and expensive 
litigation. 
The combined effect of these suggestions should be to improve the 
flow of information to creditors and make incorporation less attractive 
than it is at the present time. It also presupposes a vigilant and 
sympathetic judiciary since without the co-operation of the courts the 
new provisions may prove to be spineless. 
One further step can be recommended without hesitation. We need 
much more detailed information about the effects of limited liability and 
its impact on particular classes of creditors. We would also benefit greatly 
from learning how successful the EEC countries have been in curbing the 
abuses of the corporate form of business organization without denying 
their owners the benefits of limited liability. 
77. The "Delaware" phenomenon and its impact on shareholder welfare have in recent 
years provoked a substantial body of scholarly literature in the U.S. See J.S. Ziegel et 
al., supra, note 1, at p. 234-235. For an excellent examination of the virtues and 
disadvantages of competing corporations Acts in the Canadian context, see R. Daniels, 
"Should Provinces Compete ? The Case for a Comprehensive Corporate Law Market" 
(publication pending in the McGill Law Journal). Whatever the benefits that 
incorporators may derive from easy incorporation, it should be clear that a uniform 
regime for the protection of creditors' rights is superior to ten provincial regimes. The 
Canadian Fathers of Confederation rightly appreciated this distinction when they 
conferred the bankruptcy power on the federal government. See Constitution Act 1867, 
s.91(21). 
78. It would be argued that a rule of automatic subordination would deprive the borrower 
corporation of a cheap source of loan capital or deprive it of access to outside funding 
where its credit rating is too poor to make it eligible for commercial loans. 
